

God and Nation: Religious Influences on Polish & Ukrainian Identity

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Abstract

With key focus on the preponderance of religious affiliation in Eastern Europe, I compare the national identity of a former Soviet satellite, Poland, with that of a former Soviet republic, Ukraine because they share majorities in religious affiliation, accounting too that they share a majority in *different* branches of Christianity. First, a categorical inclusion is made between Catholicism and Orthodoxy under a Christian identity to showcase historical and contemporary differentiations between nations and, periodically, to redefine the exclusivity of the nation and its interests to include foreign allies against a larger, shared ‘enemy’. Second, a historical analysis of foreign policy, e.g. membership in regional unions, will be used to ascertain religious implications on how more exclusive interpretations of national identity was used to (re)define ‘enemies’ for the purpose of (often forcibly) homogenizing the population and how Ukraine fails to make its definition on more explicitly religious grounds. Lastly, analysis of potential predictors of political mobilization from Wittenberg will be used in conjunction to the rhetoric employed by mainstream ‘populist’ candidates/parties that hold power in Poland and Ukraine.

Keywords: Ukraine, Poland, Bulwark, Nationalism, Christianity, Religion, Populism

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When considering the control the Soviet Union wielded on its subjects, a popular question is posed in the circles of political scientists: how do the successor states of state-socialism vary so deeply in attitudes toward civil society, liberalism, and capitalism when they all roughly began (re)creation of their nation from a similar point of departure? The state-socialism which infected their respective economic, social, and political systems was internally consistent, elaborate in structure, unusually invasive in practice, and regionally encased¹. Each socialist regime in Eastern Europe shared three fundamental similarities²: a sponsored egalitarian ideology which sought to destroy highlighted differences in the state subjects, notably differences in wealth and capital that occur from competition inherent to capitalism, in addition to differences that naturally result in developing a genuine religious affiliation and national/cultural identity; a fusion of politics and economics; and a leadership which acted as an economic, political, and social monopoly that dictated how these systems functioned on a day-to-day basis according to the aforementioned egalitarian ideology.

When looking at contemporary Ukraine and Poland, each a successor to its former socialist regime, the radical social and political transformations seem to have failed in eradicating religious affiliation, which translates into their contemporary national identities. Ukraine is an overwhelmingly Orthodox Christian nation, with nearly eight-in-ten adults (78%) identifying as Orthodox (compared with 71% in Russia), according to a 2015 Pew Research Center survey³. This is up from 39% in 1991, when Ukraine had initially gained its

¹ Bunce, "The Political Economy of Postsocialism," (1999), 756.

² Bunce, 757.

³ Masci, "Split between Ukrainian, Russian Churches Shows Political Importance of Orthodox Christianity," Pew Research Center

independence. Likewise, 87% of respondents in Poland in 2015 identified as Catholic⁴. With remarkable number of religious believers, even in the face of state-enforced atheism of their recent past, majorities maintain that such belief is important to understanding their national identity. 64% of Poles believe that being part of the dominant religious group is ‘very or somewhat important to truly share in the national identity’⁵ whereas only 51% of Ukrainians share this view. It is hard to interpret how these views, alone, translate into defining political and social institutions as the same poll reveals that 70% of Poles, who possess an unofficial state religion, Catholicism, support a separation of church and state whereas only 57% of Ukrainians support a separation of church and state, even without an official or unofficial state religion.

The current Law and Order Party (PiS) in Poland shares its victory on religious rhetoric despite polls suggesting such integration of religion and politics is unpopular. Interestingly, Ukrainian President Zelensky abstains from employing religious rhetoric, despite no obvious opposition in polls to religious rhetoric. To show an example of Poland’s Law and Justice Party, we refer to the perspective of its supporters. Anna Malinowska, a mother to a family of seven in Jasienica Rosielna, a village of 2,256 in the far southeast Podkarpackie region, explains in Foreign Policy that she always liked that “[PiS] represent[s] Christian values,’ which she defined by referring to one of the unofficial mottos of Poland: ‘God, Honor, Fatherland.’”⁶

In contrast, Volodymyr Zelensky, elected to Ukrainian president in 2019 with the largest split since Ukraine’s independence at 73% of the vote, won by employing a rhetoric that

⁴ “Religious Affiliation in Central and Eastern Europe,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, May 31, 2020

⁵ Kishi and Starr, “Religion a Part of National Identity in Central, Eastern Europe,” Pew Research Center (Pew Research Center, May 31, 2020),

⁶ Kalan, “A Tale of Two Polands,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2019

“unflinchingly labeled Russia as an aggressor, maintained Ukraine’s legally inviolable sovereignty, and generally cast Ukraine as a nation in the European mold⁷,” emphasizing perceptually that Ukrainian identity today is best defined by factors outside of religious affiliation.

In this paper, three variables will be discussed to contrast contemporary Polish and Ukrainian identity: their respective *bulwark myth*, *foreign policy*, and *rhetoric*. It will begin with examination of the bulwark myths that make up these two borderland nations to reveal how national identity is redefined over time according to the circumstances where a more inclusive concept of nation is advantageous and circumstances where an exclusive definition is more advantageous. Furthermore, examination of historical and contemporary foreign policy will reveal a general pattern that rhetoric and policy, in domestic and foreign affairs alike, align to the bulwark myth the ruling party commits to. Lastly, speculation will be made on why the current ruling parties have decided to enact their brand of national identity in examination of the religious demographics of contemporary Ukraine and Poland. It will conclude that while religious affiliation historically played a substantial role in developing the bulwark myths that constitute Polish and Ukrainian national identities, Poland’s foreign policy and rhetoric maintains religious symbolism to legitimate its more exclusive definition of nation in opposition to Ukraine’s more inclusive (to European standards) secular definition as a reproach of Russian aggression.

⁷ Rojavin, “Zelensky’s Rhetorical Policy in the Face of Putino-Trumpian Disinformation,” Law & Public Policy Program, January 13, 2020.

Section 1: The Bulwark Myth

The term *bulwark myth* will be put into its historical context to explain its role in defining the perceptual circumstances of various geopolitical issues, a fundamentally problematic ‘outside’ and a virtuous ‘inside’ in need of protection. Geopolitical conflicts, thus, serve as chief reasons why a more inclusive concept of ‘nation’ would be adopted, like the unity of Ukraine and Poland, both, with the conceptual (European) Christendom to defeat the Muslim ‘Other’.

Developing Own’s Identity by Defining the ‘Other’

Bulwark myths fall under political myths: simplified narratives, i.e. selective and normative interpretations of a politically constituted community’s origin and character, to produces a meaningful orientation by providing the verification of various modes of behavior and values in that ‘imagined community’.⁸ When considering that the construction of these myths are done so through selective readings of history, it explains why various identities change over time as the various authors of this ‘collective autobiography’ manipulate which values, heroes, and cultural icons are necessary to align with and which need to be purged from the collective memory.

These imagined communities may form their identities by the physical boundaries forced upon them, like the erection of Jewish Ghettos⁹ which solidified more exclusively Jewish identities in a given polity, but such historical boundaries only exist as a *possible* influence for the construction of an identity because it is difficult to ascertain *which* borders will remain foundational to their identity. This is particularly puzzling when it comes to borderland nations like Poland and Ukraine whose contemporary borders consist of various historical empires.

⁸ Berežnaâ and Hein-Kircher, “Rampart Nations” pp. 1-30, 5.

⁹ Berežnaâ and Hein-Kircher, “Rampart Nations” pp. 103-124.

However, in differentiating the more general political myth with a bulwark myth, bulwark myths maintain a devoted *emotional* narrative that identifies an outside threat, which also simultaneously defines the characteristics of the community that are valuable; introducing promise of securing the community over the conceptual space they believe to be their own that the ‘Other’ is encroaching on. Security thus depends on answering spatial questions: where does the community literally and conceptually start and stop; what are its borders?¹⁰ To prevent answering this question prematurely as this question appears to be concerned with the political manifestation of nationalism and thus policy-related interpretations, I maintain inquiry in how an identity emerges in the first place. (The second section related to foreign policy will observe the explicit politics of this identity).

Defining the roots of ‘nation’ or ‘nationalism’ is a task not taken up lightly in political science circles and so I take two already qualified positions presented in *National Identity and Foreign Policy* and attempt to interpret various Eastern European arrangements and events to further qualify them. One definition from Hans Kohn, in reduced form, is that the emergence of ‘national’ conceptions results from a region’s declining religion and rejection of etatism¹¹. A second definition from Ernest Gellner is that ‘cultural bonds and linguistic links in a highly literate, modern society’ produce ‘national assertiveness’.¹²

I might be seen as preferring Kohn’s definition as it holds religious affiliation as paramount in understanding the emergence (or lack thereof) of national identities, but I will demonstrate that such a rigid definition fails to include the examples of inclusive interpretations

¹⁰ Berežnaâ and Hein-Kircher, 7.

¹¹ In the early 20th century, the policy of state socialism was sometimes referred to as etatism

¹² Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy*, 13.

of nation for opportunistic alliances against a shared enemy. While it would be true, generally speaking, that Kohn's technique¹³ of identifying a 'national identity's' emergence from how a community responds to and interprets prolonged contact with a conceptual 'other' is effective, it does not account for nuances that result from complex circumstances which affect neighboring nations.

The first example would be on the creation of a European identity and a more broad Christian identity which was capitalized by Ukrainians and Poles alike who viewed themselves and their specific regions as *the bulwark* against anti-Christian threats *on behalf of Christendom*.

Enea Silvio Piccolomini, councilor to the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, is believed to be the first to popularize political rhetoric that implicated *all* European nations in a collective identity, defining itself as an "inside peace" founded in opposition to an "outside war"¹⁴.

Piccolomini's construction of mental borders, i.e. a peaceful Catholic Europe, was developed on an exaggerated threat he viewed from the Turks, described as a "disgraceful" and "sexually impure" people whose humanity, religion, and culture are antithetical to Christian tradition¹⁵.

Thus, popularity was found in all of the Christian nations who intended to keep out the threatening Asiatic, Muslim 'onslaught', whether it was the Mongols, Turks, Tatars, or, more contentiously and in allusion to the second section, migrants.

The emergence of a bulwark metaphor, while not exclusive to European history, was largely canonized within the political context of the fall of Constantinople for various related reasons, one of which was the rising medium of printing that enlarged the European public

¹³ Prizel, 16.

¹⁴ Weiland, "The Origins of Antemurale Christianitatis Myths", 36.

¹⁵ Weiland, 37-38.

sphere and thus increased public access to knowledge of these events and the mass duplication of bulwark rhetoric used to describe it¹⁶. Now, there is sufficient evidence to ponder whether the popularization of the bulwark myth and the national identities whom relied on it only arose because the technology allowed for public access to its rhetoric in maps, schoolbooks, and travel guides, but, nonetheless, it is evident that these played a significant role in getting the public behind an understood and agreed upon identity.

The insistence from the available print and from the rhetoric invoked by leaders surrounding the fall of Constantinople allowed for a more inclusive definition of nation, broadly defined as ‘Christian’, as it was defined by the political interests of the powers that be. Ukraine and Poland alike, in accordance to their respective authorities, accepted such an inclusive definition and prided their given cultural cavities as being especially effective at protecting the Christians, with Cossacks (selectively) praised in the national myth as uniquely favorable to defense of the region and Ukrainian identity¹⁷ (Russian, too) and Polish L’viv¹⁸ for being the bulwark tasked to protect all of Europe.

Yet, again, lost in the nuances of opportunistic acceptance of inclusive identification of a nation that Kohn omits, we see that history does not prove that such inclusivity is long lasted. These bulwarks tasked to protect all of Europe (or Russia) or Christianity do not lose sight of their more exclusive characteristics. In approaching the second definition from Ernest Gellner, ‘cultural bonds and linguistic links in a highly literate, modern society’ produce ‘national assertiveness’, it becomes easier to define nationalism’s growth in Poland and Ukraine.

¹⁶ Weiland, 41.

¹⁷ Kravchenko, “Why Didn’t the Antemurale Historical Mythology Develop in Early Nineteenth-Century Ukraine?”, pp. 207-240

¹⁸ Hein-Kircher, “Securitizing the Polish Bulwark”, pp. 81-102

Rampart Nations includes several chapters devoted to understanding how specific academic tools were manipulated to fit Ukraine's or Poland's specific bulwark myths. Travel guides, intentionally or unintentionally, highlighting culturally significant landmarks of the Polish identity at the time, like L'viv, and omitting more traditionally understood landmarks of the Galician authority like Warsaw¹⁹; schoolbooks printed in Polish, and eventually Ukrainian, mass producing bulwark rhetoric within accounts of history which facilitated the emergence of an identity independent of the Habsburg Monarchy as they viewed their own cultural icons and linguistic patterns in print²⁰. These methods of mass producing, most specifically print, served functionally to make available the myth to the collective it was intended to define.

An Exclusive Vision for a European Nation

I conclude that there is significance in this historical appeal to Christianity, to ultimately unite 'Christians' against a Muslim, Asiatic 'Other', because it allowed for a more inclusive definition of nation, even if just temporarily. These bulwark myths legitimated the importance of aligning with Christians to defeat an existential threat, and though not empirically expressed in this paper that it parallels alignment against the Soviet Union as a conceptual 'Other', these views would hardly be considered consistent in the contemporary nations.

As is stated in Gellner's definition, the linguistic and cultural practices in a highly literate community further fractionate communities to develop ever more exclusive nations, which may be found in religious affiliation as well, given the crossroads that emerged between three main branches of Christianity by the 1795 partition and an awakening of national consciousness²¹. The

¹⁹ Hein-Kircher, 81, 82, 94-102

²⁰ Hofeneder, "Translating the Border(s) in a Multilingual and Multiethnic Society", pp. 241-261

²¹ Prizel, 40.

second section will elaborate further how national foreign policy reveals Polish and Ukrainian identities in opposition to their previously inclusive view of themselves: Polish alignment with Catholic Europe and Ukrainian alignment with Orthodox Russia.

Section 2: Foreign Policy and Regional Membership

This section will be the examination of foreign policy, e.g. membership in regional organizations, to explore which events in its national history are being highlighted with analysis as to why those particular events symbolically represent the exclusive bulwark myth employed by the nation.

Western Disillusionment in Poland, but not in Ukraine.

With respect to the original perspective shared in Poland and Ukraine²², the former a tormented Christian bulwark for Europe and the latter a tormented Christian bulwark for Russia, these inclusive identities fail to apply in contemporary times as grievances accrued against the larger identity and new political circumstances emerged to voice such grievances.

To support my claim that the bulwark myth is flexible to the circumstances of the time, the internationalist Polish Romantics whose orientation was always anti-Russian and thus towards the West grew weaker after becoming disillusioned in 1830²³. This event appears to be a parallel to current Western disillusionment evident in the contemporary conflicts²⁴ between Poland (and Hungary) with the EU which frames itself as neither supporting Russia or Europe. This disillusionment isn't shared with Ukraine who continues its appeals to join the EU; but this,

²² Malorussia, or Little Russia, was another name during the early reign of the Russian Empire Kravchenko, pp. 207-240

²³ Polish commitment to liberation movements in North America and Western Europe remained unreciprocated by those nations when the Poles rose up, without broad international support, to Russian rule Prizel, pg. 42-43

²⁴ "Hungary and Poland to Counter Critics with 'Rule of Law Institute'." Guardian News and Media, October 28, 2020.

again, is fractured along geographic and ethnic lines which happen to overlap with religious affiliations²⁵, but are not fueled necessarily in an explicitly Christian framework, as Zelensky's rhetoric incorporates bulwark rhetoric, not on faith, but as a perceptual litmus test of Russian aggression and Ukraine's disapproval of such aggression.

In looking at Poland specifically, Christian themes appear to be held as foundational to the current interpretation of its national identity, particularly the view of 're-Christianizing' Europe as the 'Christ of Nations'²⁶. And this hardly seems out of place given the theological crossroads that emerged between three main branches of Christianity in the 1795 partition²⁷. Poland, a Catholic nation, is surrounded by a sea of Orthodoxy²⁸ and its historical Catholic neighbors are hesitant to be called anything but secular, humanists²⁹. Ukraine does not share this easy distinction with its geopolitical foe as they share the Orthodox Faith and nationalization of the faith isn't widely popular, with only a plurality supporting such a religious separation^{30 31}.

However, as is argued in *Against European Integration*, the presence of Christian rhetoric need not be theologically supported as the various populist appeals to a 'return' to the 'cultural unity [of Europe] without empire' fundamentally boils down to an appeal to a 'folkloric religion' that serves the sole purpose of orienting the national myth in favor of antiestablishment sentiments³². Likewise, a bulwark myth relying on more emotional appeals to threats and protection might find itself more fashionable in Catholic nations, like Poland, who tend to view

²⁵ Masci, Pew Research Center

²⁶ Berend, *Against European Integration: the EU and Its Discontents*, 96-97.

²⁷ Prizel, 40

²⁸ Kishi and Starr, (Pew Research Center, May 31, 2020)

²⁹ Berend, 84-85

³⁰ "Religious Affiliation in Central and Eastern Europe," May 31, 2020

³¹ "Patriarch Filaret Asks Zelensky to Protect Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate." Filaret asks Zelensky to protect Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, July 31, 2019.

³² Berend, 95.

the consequence of failing to act morally as stronger, i.e. going to Hell or Heaven, than in Orthodox nations, like Ukraine.³³ So thus, with the previously cited 90% Catholic Polish demographic, it is easier to appeal to the religious themes that simplify the problems facing the nation to a single bogeyman, the *heretics*. The declining birthrate and increased emigration³⁴ (particularly of young people), and profound brain-drain³⁵ results can thus be framed as more reason to distance Poland from the secular EU which promised higher economic prosperity, but actively stifled³⁶ it. The creation of an ‘enemy’ responsible for all the ‘misery’ appears to fit Poland’s religious myth better through economic stimulation aimed at families and its corresponding conservative rhetoric³⁷ and Ukraine’s myth more so on ‘Russia’ preventing the economic and cultural prosperity afforded by European integration.

The largest difference being Ukraine who largely focuses its identity in opposition to Russian cultural imperialism. Their relationship expressed in the myth by their negative interactions³⁸; ceasing oil supply negotiations, fueling separatist sentiments in ethnic enclaves, and wholly occupying Crimea, thus promoting the view of Russia as an ‘Other’ through their overreaction to Westernization; a positive feedback loop between Ukrainian westernization and Russian hostile reaction which only reinforces the myth of an inclusive definition of being Ukrainian by being composed of ‘non-Russianness’.

³³ Overall, Catholics are more likely than Orthodox Christians to believe in heaven or hell. . . the median shares of Catholics who believe in heaven and hell are 78% and 66%, respectively and for Orthodox Christians, the corresponding figures are 61% and 58%.

“Religious Affiliation in Central and Eastern Europe,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, May 31, 2020

³⁴ Berend, 82

³⁵ Berend, 83

³⁶ Berend explains that GDP was projected to have been 7% higher if Poland had not suffered its brain-drain

³⁷ Berend, 85

³⁸ Berend, 136-137, 140

Section 3: Where Lies the Populist Vote?

Relying heavily on the implications made by Wittenberg in *Crucibles of Political Loyalty*, I speculate whether *religious* institutions play a current role by observing what rhetoric is used by each nation's populist leaders.

Why is Poland 'Right-Wing'?

The 'microfoundations' of national assertions are understood to be founded in the power of local institutions, even in the face of extended repression, e.g. Soviet social, economic, and political monopolies, to act as focal points for 'mutual interaction' which I relate to the conception of developing a broadly agreed upon conception of an 'other' and thus a 'self'. Wittenberg states that once the Communist Party assumed power, "the Churches became the last refuge for those with right-wing loyalties and battled the Party for mass influence for the remainder of the communist period. This epic struggle pitted parish priests and pastors, who encouraged robust religious practice, against Party activists, who sought to restrict church life."³⁹

Here an obvious dichotomy of an other and a self is presented, particularly since the Communist Party acted as a monopoly on social, economic, and political attitudes, it will inherently be popular to position the Communists as the conceptual 'Other' and all those not Communist as temporarily the same 'Self' which supports my claim that the opportunistic acceptance of an inclusive definition of nation is found in the cases where a shared, existential threat is presented to all communities in a region. This appears to be true with Russia and Ukraine, but not so in Poland who increasingly limits its conceptual allies as it increases its

³⁹ Wittenberg, *Crucibles of Political Loyalty*, 2012. Pp. 236-237

threats from Russia, Europe, and citizens who fail to assimilate to Polish-interpretations of Catholicism.

Now, to push back on projecting a parallel from Wittenberg's analysis of Hungary onto Poland and Ukraine, we see that the organization of the Churches in Poland is not as comparable to that of Hungary.

However, it is not clear whether such persistence is rooted in the Churches, though in both instances there is good reason to think so. The Polish case is perhaps the easiest to make because the Catholic Church there was the strongest Church in the bloc and actually gained organizational strength during the communist period. Unlike in Hungary, most Poles retained loyalties to the Church through the 1960s and beyond.

In the cases of Poland and Ukraine, it would be necessary to examine which local institutions maintained a 'community of practice that girded individuals against pressures to adopt the dominant political values' and thus promoted *their* vision of themselves, their origins, and their character which may or may not be different from its neighbors in religious affiliation, etc. Likewise, it would be important to notate if any such persistent identity even manifested itself in an exclusively political attitude that lie in any obvious direction (rightist, leftist). This seems to be less true, globally, as the home of right-wing populists decades ago are now filled with left-wing populists⁴⁰ and the causes for such a turn-around aren't self-evident which reduces my confidence in making any assertion.

In accordance with progressively adapting the bulwark myth of each respective nation, it appears more opportunistic manipulation of policies by leaders to please the majority demographics with some general consistency to the myth (exclusive Catholicism in Poland and non-Russianness, defined by Europeanness, which in turn is inclusive, in Ukraine).

⁴⁰ About 60 percent of populist leaders and presidents of countries were right-wing populist; nowadays, 70 percent of them are left-wing populists
Berend, p. 84-85

Conclusion

Limitations. One stems from noting that each source devoted their research to a very specific data set, time period and/or region, which cannot easily be transferable to other periods of history, or regions, within the same nation, let alone transferable as a general political science rule for other nations of the same region. The emergence of national and political identities for Poland or Ukraine, or even Eastern Europe in general, are broadly inconsistent, and intentionally so, especially when observed over long periods of time and thus study of historical events of these nations hardly produces a reliable prediction of political and national policies in the near future or present. This suggests rather that I acquired evidence that the emergence and continuation of a national myth, and the more emotionally-driven bulwark myth, are intentionally selective and simplified for the purpose of maintaining orientation to fit its political/social goals which is extremely difficult to predict.

Another limitation is that a systemic bias may be perpetuated by my analysis of the readings as my explicit goal of acquiring evidence to support my hypothesis of religious affiliation's importance in political myth-making and representation leads me to choose readings which highlight religion's role in Eastern Europe. My sample of all possible sources that could reveal predictors of Eastern European myth-making and political mobilization may be biased in this manner and I speculate whether another variable overlaps with what one considers to be religious affiliation, like gender-composition, ethnic-composition, and historical treatment of women, which may result in more humanist, stereotypically Western national myths in Eastern Europe like Ukraine's relative to Poland.

Takeaways. There are, of course, endless limitations that I am unaware of and that I intentionally left out. However, I hope that this paper argued adequately enough to inspire curiosity for research into a related topic.

Section 1 indicated that there were examples in which a more inclusive national identity is accepted which may spark curiosity as to what kinds of conditions must be present to accept such broad definition, or, if it is instead observation of a threat being so large that consideration of national identity is temporarily lost in favor of reducing the public anxiety of said threat, e.g. Mongol Invasion, Soviet Union monopolization of society, economy, and politics.

Section 2 indicated the degree to which ever more exclusive definitions were made and how they were revealed in foreign policy and domestic policy, for symbolic and physical purposes alike. This, coupled with the observation of technological progress and the increased availability of rhetoric and considerations of historical events that shape national identity, may inspire curiosity for further research to formulate the degree to which exclusive definitions of nation are a result of an ever-increasing information age and the willingness for groups online to develop their own identity against academic, expert interpretations of the information. Likewise, the role of fake news in the information age and how, as identity is fundamentally a simplified narrative, it fuels narratives that wouldn't otherwise exist.

Section 3 indicated that the current populist parties resort to appeals to the myth, or narrative, that they predict will bear the most fruit, support, for their future elections which are religious themes in Poland and anti-Russian themes in Ukraine. The research to clarify my responses may be found in ethnic-composition, Jews in Poland and Russians in Ukraine, and the proportion to which they make up the population, are willing to vote, and are represented in the media.

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